Since US President Donald Trump issued an executive order in January titled Unleashing American Energy, the term “energy dominance” has been ubiquitous in Washington’s energy policy circles. The executive order directed federal agencies to remove barriers to fossil fuel expansion, revoked environmental requirements, paused disbursement of certain funds under the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and directed federal agencies to expedite permitting processes.
On February 14, Trump followed up with another executive order to establish the National Energy Dominance Council. According to the executive order, the council was established to “advise the president on how best to exercise his authority to produce more energy to make America energy dominant.” But after more than seven months, it is still not clear what “energy dominance” would mean in practice besides its colonial connotations.
If “dominance” is about being the world’s largest oil and gas producer and a major energy exporter, the United States has already been a net total energy exporter since 2019. Even under the Biden administration, the United States became the world’s largest exporter of liquified natural gas . That, again, begs the question-
In a recent interview with one of the architects of the Council, he explained that energy dominance means “everything that is required to have a US-led energy supply chain that hooks allies to the United States and unhooks people from our adversaries.” Simply put, energy dominance is unleashing energy production and exports to dominate other countries relying on these energy imports. However, this energy production does not happen in isolation from the energy market’s supply and demand balance. It would ultimately result in the “dominant” producer – the United States – either having less energy available for domestic consumption or unprofitably generating energy for export. Also, the energy-intensive nature of modern society, and the United States in particular, make achieving energy dominance almost impossible.
Additionally, unleashing this level of energy production is not necessarily compatible with the US energy market dynamics. For example, the breakeven price for a barrel of oil from a new well in the Permian region ranges from $61-$70 per barrel. This means that lower prices of oil would impede US oil producers’ ability to drill new wells.
If any country had come close to energy dominance in the modern history, it would have been Saudi Arabia. From 1980 to 2000, Saudi Arabia produced, on average, four times the energy it consumed, keeping a substantial spare capacity to influence the global energy market. However, the global energy mix has changed over the past fifty years, and oil now represents less than a third of global energy consumption. In addition, Saudi Arabia is experiencing a significant increase in energy demand driven by economic growth and its growing population. As close as Saudi Arabia was to energy dominance in decades past, energy market dynamics and geopolitics rendered such a target impossible.
Even as China continues to lead the world in clean tech manufacturing and investments, it can’t be viewed as energy dominant because its growing energy consumption is outpacing its economic growth. Since no country in history achieved economic growth by using less energy, increasing domestic energy demand would always dictate a country’s energy planning before “dominating” other countries.
Although China has a pronounced influence on global markets, this influence is not isolated from its own economic and industrial growth plans. Such interdependence provides another real-world example of why touting the goal of “energy dominance” does not reflect an adequate understanding of how modern energy systems and global markets work.
While energy dominance is not attainable, another race for leadership is unfolding with energy at its center—the global artificial intelligence (AI) race. Countries are rapidly developing notable AI models and boosting production of AI accelerators to hold larger market shares of the growing AI market. Despite the digital nature of AI, the power-hungry data centers make physical infrastructure such as power grids and advanced chips manufacturing facilities deciding factors on who would take the lead in that race.
After nearly two decades of little change, US electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 50 percent by 2050 driven by a sharp increase in energy consumption of data centers. To cope with this unprecedented growth in electricity demand, the United States will need to support the development of grid technologies and manufacturing of critical grid infrastructure.
With the enactment of the “One Big Beautiful Bill,” a legislative package repealing clean energy funding programs and manufacturing tax credits, it is estimated that new electricity capacity additions would decrease by 120 gigawatts (GW) by 2030 and 330 GW by 2035. While natural gas capacity is projected to grow by 19 GW by 2035, current supply chain constraints would prevent growth in natural gas capacity in the next five years. According to the International Energy Agency, energy consumption of data centers in the United States is expected to increase by 240 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2030—a130 percent increase compared to 2024. The next five years will be critical for the global AI race, but the One Big Beautiful Bill has made it more challenging to meet the growing electricity demand.
The analysis presented in this piece shows that no country, including the United States, can credibly claim energy dominance. Carrying that forward, continuing this Sisyphean pursuit could cost the United States the global AI race, which the evidence equally suggests it is capable of winning. It is time for US policymakers to stop talking about “energy dominance” and start talking about how the United States can ensure an affordable, reliable, and clean energy supply. This could prevent the derailment of US clean tech manufacturing and secure US leadership in AI development.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of any entities he represents.
Mahmoud Abouelnaga is an Industrial Decarbonization Expert at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. He leads UNIDO’S global portfolio on developing industrial decarbonization hubs in emerging and developing economies. He is an energy engineer and climate policy expert with global work experience in clean energy technologies, environmental management, and climate policy.
